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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
emergency, to extend its immunity to property in which it has an
undivided equitable interest. That is, property in which the title
vests in a third party but which is partly paid for by the Government,
as in the case of 60 Payment Facility Contracts previously discussed.
Thus, it is interesting to observe that the field of tax avoidance
is one in which the Federal Government plays a dual role; as tax
collector it seeks to extend the scope of its taxes and block all
possible loopholes; as a participant in commercial and industrial
activities, it musters every legal expedient in an effort to avoid taxes.
RAPHAEL J. Musicus.
EQUITABLE RELIEF FROM NEGLIGENT STATEMENTS AND
MISREPRESENTATIONS
The traditional doctrine of the law of torts requires one who
undertakes to do a thing, even though gratuitously, to act with care
if he acts at all. However, this rule is greatly modified when the
act is in the form of the spoken or written word rather than in the
form of a physical act. In such case the principle has been that
"negligent words are not actionable unless they are uttered directly,
with knowledge or notice that they will be acted on, to one to whom
the speaker is bound by some relation of duty, arising out of public
calling, contract or otherwise, to act with care if he acts at all." 1
Liability for misrepresentation is similarly restricted to instances in-
volving a breach of duty.
While it is true that an action will lie for slander or libel, there
is a broad field between the truth in a particular case and libel or
slander. Many have entered this field, or found themselves in it,
only to discover that damnum absque injuria is more than a Latin
phrase. The fact that the interests of the public are injured by mis-
representations or negligent statements or that the untruth results in
a public nuisance appears to be of no concern to a court of equity.
In 1830 the courts of this state set down, and have since quite
rigidly followed, the rule that "when the words are spoken, not of
the trader or manufacturer, but of the quality of the articles he makes
or deals in, to render them actionable per se, they must import that
the plaintiff is guilty of deceit or malpractice in making or vending
them." 2 In the absence of such a libel or slander impeaching the
integrity, knowledge, skill, diligence or credit of the plaintiff, the
words are not actionable unless special damage be alleged and proved,
2 Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & S. B. Co., 245 N. Y. 377, 157 N. E.
272 (1927).2 Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. 537 (N. Y. 1830).
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and a "general allegation of loss of customers is not sufficient to
enable the plaintiff to show a particular injury." 3
Fifty-five years ago the United States District Court, Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, had before it a request by a manufacturer
of cement in Rosendale, New York, to enjoin a manufacturer in
Lehigh, Pennsylvania, from designating its cement as "Rosendale
Cement", a name that had been used by manufacturers in Rosendale
for many years and had become a by-word for a particular type of
product.4 Damages for the business diverted through the false rep-
resentation were also sought.
From the point of natural justice the complaint was a valid one
and any fair-minded business man would not have. hesitated to grant
the relief sought. The established rules of law, however, prevented
the relief, the court stating: "No man can maintain a private action
for a public nuisance, though he is injured by it, unless his injury is
of such a special character, different from that which is sustained by
the public generally. This is a sound rule of the common law. It is
intended to prevent. vexatious litigation. When an injury is a public
one it should be prosecuted as a public wrong. So here the wrong,
if there, is one, is committed against the public. If it be said that the
cement manufacturers Of Rosendale are specially injured, because
their trade is affected, it may be properly answered that they are all
injured alike. It is a public injury as to them, just as it would be to
all the dealers in linen for a man to sell as Irish linen fabrics that are
not such. It is a damage to the complainants and the other cement
manufacturers of Rosendale for the defendants to sell their cement
as Rosendale cement, but, like many other causes of damage, in our
judgment, it is that kind which the law calls dainnum absque
injuria." 5
Equity's claim that it stands ready to take jurisdiction when the
remedy at law is inadequate has always been its forte. But, when
having taken jurisdiction, equity decides that nothing can be done,
although freely admitting that a wrong has been committed, the law-
yer as well as the layman wonders where next to turn.
Although many have appeared at the bar of justice requesting
relief from the misrepresentations or negligent statements of their
neighbors or competitors, each is turned away with the explanation
that the proof of special damages at law will grant the relief sought;
equity, therefore, will not intervene. To prove the special damages
with the particularity required is conceded to be a hopeless if not
impossible task. But there we stood, and still we stand.
An interesting case arose some twelve years later in the courts
of New York.6 A magazine publisher whose advertising sales were
3 Ibid.4 New York & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 44 Fed. 277, 10 L.
R. A. 833 (1890).
5 Ibid.
6 Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902).
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suffering from a decreasing circulation, %eeking to regain the adver-
tising of a nationally known manufacturer of fine rifles whose displays-
in the magazine had been cancelled, published damaging articles
apparently written by real correspondents, but in fact written by the
publisher himself. At first the articles purported to explain why the
advertising had been discontinued, but in later issues progressed to
a disparaging comparison of the manufacturer's article with those of
competitors; a studied program was undertaken with the admitted
purpose of inducing the public to buy another manufacturer's product
or to coerce the former advertiser to continue its patronage.
The manufacturer appealed to equity for an injunction to re-
strain the publisher from continuing its malicious course. After a
review of the facts the court admitted quite frankly that "the natural
inclination of all fair-minded men, charged with the responsibility of
administering the law, would be to relieve the plaintiff from the an-
noyance to which it is subjected from wholly unworthy motives. . ." T
But did the court follow its "natural inclination"? Quite the oppo-
site; the court without further hesitation went right on to say: "But
equity does not undertake to relieve from all the annoyances caused
by those who are inconsiderate of the feelings and business interests
of others. On the contrary, it is a general rule, which has some
exceptions, that it will not undertake to interfere where a party has
an adequate remedy at law and when it does not interfere it is guided
by principles of equity, which during the long course of its adminis-
tration have become established." 8 The "adequate remedy at law"
is, of course, proof of special damages. All that was required was
that the Marlin Arms Company furnish a court and jury with the
names and addresses of those who would have purchased Marlin
rifles, but who were dissuaded from so doing because of the false
articles printed in defendant's magazine and then prove the resultant
loss! Needless to say, there is no record of Marlin's having so much
as attempted to avail itself of this "adequate remedy at law".
Efforts have been made to break away from tradition and rec-
ognize the wrong done in such instances by granting adequate relief,
but thus far the efforts have been unavailing. Forty years ago, Judge
Gray of the New York Court of Appeals voiced his ohjections to the
attitude of the courts in failing to grant relief when natural justice
demanded such relief. In an opinion strongly dissenting from the
court's failure to grant an injunction in a suit involving the right of
privacy, he stated: "In the social evolution, with the march of the
arts and sciences and in the resultant effects upon organized society,
it is quite intelligible that new conditions must arise in personal rela-
tions, which the rules of the common law, cast in the rigid mould of
an earlier social status, were not designed to meet. It would be a
reproach to equitable jurisprudence, if equity were powerless to
71d. at 389. 64 N. E. at 164.8 Ibid.
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extend the application of the principles of common law, or of natural
justice, in remedying a wrong, which, in the progress of civilization,
has been made possible as the result of new social, or commercial
conditions." 9 But this objection has gone unheeded.
While courts of law have seen fit to award damages for negligent
statements when a close privity between the parties has been estab-
lished,' 0 generally speaking, in the absence of libel or slander, words
are not actionable without proof of special damage. The legal prin-
ciple is tersely reiterated in Jaillet v. Cashnan." The court, while
sympathizing with an aggrieved plaintiff who sought to prevent a
competitor from making false representations to the plaintiff's cus-
tomers concerning the plaintiff's product, distinguished between busi-
ness ethics and law: "There is moral obligation upon everyone to say
nothing that is not true, but the law does not attempt to impose lia-
bility for a violation of that duty unless it constitutes a breach of
contract obligation or trust, or amounts to a deceit, libel or slander.
Theoretically, a different rule might be logically adopted, but as a
matter of practical expediency such a doctrine seems absolutely
necessary."
In most instances the courts have recognized the public interests
involved, and the losses caused to members of the community through
negligent representations, but in each such instance the courts have
shrugged their shoulders and have held that the right to relief rests
in the public or the state and not in the aggrieved plaintiff. "We
heartily condemn such business methods, but we find no grounds in
precedent or reason for extending the jurisdiction so far as to enjoin
them."' 2
Thus, as applied to such cases, stare decisis leads to legal stability
and commercial instability. No adequate restraining force exists to
prevent disparagement of property in New York, and the remedy at
law, requiring allegation and proof of special damages leaves the
victim helpless. "It is settled by authority that a libel on a thing is
not actionable unless the owner of the thing alleges and proves that
he has sustained pecuniary loss as a necessary consequence of the
publication." '3 "Words relating merely to the quality of the articles
made, produced, furnished or sold by a person though false and
malicious, are not actionable without special damage." 14
As heretofore indicated, the courts will award damages to one to
9 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 561, 64 N. E.
442, 449 (1902).
10 International Products Co. v. Erie R. R., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662
(1927); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922); Bush
Terminal Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 182 App. Div. 748, 169 N. Y.
Supp. 734 (1918).
11 115 Misc. 383, 189 N. Y. Supp. 743 (1921).
12 Allen Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187, 192, 229 N. Y. Supp.
692, 699 (1928).
13 Kennedy v. Press Publishing Co., 41 Hun 422 (N. Y. 1886).
14 Dooling v. Budget Publishing Co., 144 Mass. 258, 10 N. E. 809 (1887).
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whom a duty is owed to compensate for losses sustained through
reliance on words negligently written or spoken. But the rule is
strictly applied and the duty arising out of public calling, contract,
or otherwise must be clearly demonstrated. Great reluctance to
extend the rule exists and even though the misrepresentations or
negligent statements do great harm to one or many, unless a privity
exists between the parties, or libel or slander are involved, the courts
rely on the inaction of those jurists who preceded them.
The strictness of the rule and the reluctance to extend it is amply
demonstrated in Ultrantares v. Touche.15 Public accountants em-
ployed by a rubber importer had certified a balance sheet which pre-
sented a picture of thriving prosperity, whereas the bare facts proved
a condition of hopeless insolvency. Negligence on the part of the
accountants in failing to ascertain the facts was irrefutable. Thirty-
two copies of the balance sheet were serially numbered and furnished
to the importer. The number of copies requested and the defendant's
knowledge that the importer relied upon extensive credit to conduct
his business furnished ample notice to the defendant that, in all proba-
bility, the balance sheet would be used in obtaining credit. The
plaintiffs, on the strength of the certified report, advanced substantial
sums to the importer. When the inevitable bankruptcy occurred, the
lender sued the accountants for the loss occasioned by their negli-
gence. The court held the accountants harmless because of the lack
of, privity between the litigants. The court, in so doing, greatly
restricted the scope of "public calling" by declaring that ". . . public
accountants are public only in the sense that their services are offered
to anyone who chooses to employ them. This is far from saying
that those who do not employ them are in the same position as those
who do."
In Nann v. Raimist,16 an action between two rival labor unions,
in which the one sought to enjoin the other from issuing false and
misleading statements concerning its rival, Judge Cardozo says:
"Equity does not intervene to restrain the publication of words on a
mere showing of their falsity (Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171
N. Y. 384). It intervenes in those cases where restraint becomes
essential to the preservation of a business or other property interests
threatened with impairment by illegal combinations or by other tor-
tious acts, the publication of the words being merely an instrument
and an incident (citing cases)."
The reason advanced is that "Courts have enough to do in re-
straining physical disorder without busying themselves with logoma-
chies in which the embattled words are the expression of the opinion
of the writer or the speaker." 17
Clark, in his Principles of Equity says of disparagement of
property: "There is no plausible reason why equity should not give
is 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
16 255 N. Y. 307, 317, 174 N. E. 690, 694 (1931).
17 Id. at 318, 174 N. E. at 694.
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injunctive relief since only rights of property and not of personality
are inirolved. The strong tendency in this country, however, has
been to refuse relief .. ." and assigns as the reason therefor that it
is "due largely to confusing the subject with disparagement of
character." Is
Others have advanced as the reason for the rule the constitu-
tional guaranty of freedom of speech and press which in terms pro-
vides that "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or of the press." 19 The only limitations to this freedom are
the law of slander and libel.
Whichever reason the reader may favor, the law of New York
remains fixed that equity will not restrain disparagement of property.
Quite recently the established principles were put to a new test
under conditions which were impossible to foresee when those prin-
ciples were first established. A music publisher sought to enjoin the
American Tobacco Company from continuing its weekly radio pro-
gram "Your Hit Parade" for failing to give credit where credit
was due.20
The publisher's claim of injury arose from allegedly unfair
opinions expressed by the tobacco company in its nation-wide radio
program in which it was represented that the songs performed con-
stituted the nine or ten most popular songs of the week selected by
an extensive and accurate survey. The plaintiff further claimed that
the songs were chosen arbitrarily and without regard to any survey,
and that songs published by the plaintiff, though entitled by all proper
standards to be listed among the nation's ten most popular songs,
were, nevertheless, omitted from "Your Hit Parade". The radio
program, because of its appearance of authenticity and because of its
widespread public reception, had become in the minds of the public,
music jobbers and dealers, motion picture studios, etc., a criterion for
determining the most popular songs in the nation.
The representations of the defendant, the plaintiff asserted, were
of a nature to cause and in fact had caused damage to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff attacked from every angle; an injunction to pre-
vent the continuance of the program was demanded, fraud on the
public to the plaintiff's damage was claimed, and damages were sought
for the negligent misrepresentations.
The Appellate Division (First Department) found no difficulty
in reversing the trial court and dismissing the complaint, answering
the allegations by parading the authorities.
The injunction was refused because "in this state it is well settled
that equity will not intervene to enjoin a disparagement of property."
28 CLARx, PRINCIPLES OF EQuIr (1919) § 238.
19 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.20
.Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 268 App. Div. 707, 53
N. Y. S. (2d) 337 (1945).
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The alleged deception of the public gave no basis for relief because
"when an injury is committed against the public, that is not a matter
for complaint by plaintiff." The action for negligent misrepresenta-
tions fell because of failure to allege and prove that the defendants
were under a duty to the plaintiff to act with care and that the plain-
tiff had acted upon the negligent statements to his damage.
The court further demonstrated that relief is available only
through proof of special damages. Following the authorities devel-
oped long before the discovery of the radio, the court went on to
say: "Moreover, with respect to the second and third causes of action,
there are absent appropriate statements of special damage. In the
most general terms, plaintiff has pleaded that defendant's acts and
representations have caused it to lose sales and the opportunities to
develop its business. A disparagement may cause injury to plaintiff
and yet not be actionable. Both as a matter of pleading and proof
there must be a definite showing of specific loss of trade, that is, loss
of specific customers or sales." The plaintiff had a legitimate com-
plaint, but not a legal complaint, a new member had joined the ranks
in the field of damnum absque injuria.
Thirty years ago Dean Pound expressed with optimism a belief
that a way would be found to grant relief in cases which fell short of
the legal concept of unfair competition but which nevertheless resulted
in business losses from negligent statements or misrepresentations.
"In substance the traditional doctrine puts anyone's business at the
mercy of any insolvent malicious defamer who has sufficient imagina-
tion to lay out a skillful campaign of extortion. So long as denial
of relief in such cases rests on no stronger basis than authority our
courts are sure to find a way out." 21 Perhaps thirty years is too
soon in which to expect the courts to find a way, but it is hardly too
soon to restate the optimistic hope; too many have never heard of
the golden rule.
DONAL C. NOONAN.
NEWS-GATHERING AGENCIES AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
The Associated Press case I now awaiting final decision by the
United States Supreme Court is a landmark in the history of free-
dom of the press. 2  The issue awaiting final adjudication has been
21 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defaination and Injuries to Personality
(1916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 640, 668.
1United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (1943).
2 See CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941), for general
reference on subject of free speech and press. Also see short note: WILSON,
Freedom of the Press in CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1939)
1150-2.
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